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Abstract
We study how standard auction objectives in sponsored search markets change with
refinements in the prediction of the relevance (click-through rates) of ads. We study mech-
anisms that optimize for a convex combination of efficiency and revenue. We show that
the objective function of such a mechanism can only improve with refined (improved)
relevance predictions, i.e., the search engine has no disincentive to perform these refine-
ments. More interestingly, we show that under assumptions, refinements to relevance
predictions can only improve the efficiency of any such mechanism. Our main technical
contribution is to study how relevance refinements affect the similarity between ranking
by virtual-value (revenue ranking) and ranking by value (efficiency ranking). Finally, we
discuss implications of our results to the literature on signaling.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search is a multi-billion dollar market; it enables contextual advertising, and gen-
erates revenue that supports innovation in search algorithms. Besides being important, spon-
sored search markets are also technically interesting and have been investigated theoretically
from several perspectives. For instance, auction theory (cf. [1, 7]), game theory (cf. [26, 6]),
and bipartite matching theory (cf. [20]). See [16] for a survey.
How do these markets operate? Market efficiency (or value maximization) is achieved by
displaying relevant ads that maximize the odds of the user clicking on the impression (a shown
ad), and then succesfully transacting on the advertiser’s website. To do this, the search engine
must acquire two very different types of information. First, it must estimate the relevance
of an advertiser to the user’s query, modeled as the probability that that advertiser’s ad will
receive a click when it is shown to the user. Second, it must elicit in an incentive compatible
way the value that the advertiser has for the user’s click; this quantity is determined usually
by the the probability of transaction given a visit to the advertiser’s site, and the profit per
transaction; notice that the search engine is not privy to either quantity. The realized value
(value-per-impression) in this market is naturally modeled as a product of the value-per-click
and relevance. Indeed, it is possible that an advertiser with a low value-per-click (v1) and high
probability of click (p1) would realize a higher realized value than one with a high value-per-
click (v2) but low probability of click (p2), because v1p1 > v2p2.
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The elicitation problem mentioned above is naturally modeled via auction theory (cf. [1, 7]).
The goal here is to maximize an auction objective such as efficiency or revenue by eliciting
the value-per-click in an incentive compatible way. The estimation problem, however, is most
naturally a machine learning problem [12], that is the goal is to predict relevance using features
of the ad and the query. The relevance predictions are refined by either improving the machine
learning algorithm or by adding new features. Consider an example of a refinement: Two
pizza merchants, one from San Francisco and the other from the nearby city of San Jose, may
appear equally relevant (both have say probability p) for the query ‘pizza’ emanating from an
unspecified location in the Bay Area, but may have antisymmetric relevances on either side of
p once the user’s location within this region is further pinpointed.
The focus of this paper is to study how standard auction objectives, specifically efficiency,
behave with relevance prediction refinements like the one above.1
Conventional wisdom would suggest that refinement ought to have a positive impact on
the objective for which the auction is optimal. After all, why should more information hurt?
Consistent with this intuition, it has been shown very generally that refinements can only
improve the efficiency of the optimally efficient mechanism, or the revenue of the revenue-
optimal mechanism [10].2
Things begin to get more interesting when we study changes in the revenue of the optimally
efficient mechanism, or the efficiency of the revenue-optimal mechanism due to refinements
(indeed, the market maker may wish to optimize any combination of revenue and efficiency -
see discussion in Section 2.4). For instance, the revenue of the optimally efficient mechanism
can fall with refinements. It is easiest to see this in a single-slot context with two bidders (like
our ‘pizza’ example). Recall that the efficient auction allocates the slot to the advertiser with
the highest realized value, and charges it the second highest realized value. The refinement
suggested in the pizza example above causes relevances to become antisymmetric, and second
highest realized value to drop, thereby reducing revenue.
Similarly, we can demonstrate that the efficiency of the revenue-optimal mechanism can fall
with refinement – see Examples 2.2 and 3.2. What drives these examples? Recall (or consult
Section 2.3) that the revenue-optimal auction and the efficient auction both rank bidders (ads)
by a monotone function of their bids, ignoring ones for which this function is negative, and
allocate the remaining bidders in this sequence to the available ad slots. The key difference
is that the two mechanisms employ different functions of the bids. In these bad examples,
with refinement, the revenue-optimal ranking drifts further apart from the efficient ranking,
demonstrating that the twin objectives of revenue and efficiency are not necessarily aligned in
the context of refinement.
Our first, comparatively straightforward result (Section 4) shows that once the search en-
gine commits to a specific trade-off between efficiency and revenue, the resulting Pareto optimal
mechanism can only benefit from refinement. Thus, the search engine has no disincentive to
perform refinement.3
Our second, more technically challenging result (Section 3) is to identify assumptions
1We study incentive-compatible mechanisms. The mechanisms used in practice, though not incentive com-
patible, have equilibria that are allocation- and revenue-equivalent to the corresponding incentive compatible
mechanisms [6, 7]. So we expect our results to apply to practically used mechanisms in equilibrium.
2This paper shows that relevance prediction problem is decoupled from the value-per-click elicitation prob-
lem. That is, improvements to prediction improve the revenue of the natural Myerson mechanism.
3Obviously, this should not be at the cost of using features that violate user privacy.
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under which refinement improves the efficiency of every Pareto optimal mechanism. The
first assumption is that the value-per-click distributions are i.i.d. and satisfy the monotone
hazard rate assumption, a fairly standard assumption. The second assumption is that that
refinement causes the relevances of every pair of ads for every query to either reorder or grow
further apart; this assumption is arguably restrictive and we discuss it in Section 3.2.5. We
demonstrate that both assumptions are necessary via examples. Our main proof technique
is to show that allocation ranking of every Pareto optimal mechanism draws closer to the
efficienct ranking as refinements are performed under the assumptions mentioned earlier.
Finally, our results are also applicable to the literature on signaling (cf. [21, 3, 8, 22]).
Broadly, the connection can be described as follows: Realized value is a function of relevance,
which can be modeled as the seller’s (search engine’s) private signal, and of the value-per-
click, which is the bidder’s (advertiser’s) private signal. In our model, the seller knows that
the bidder’s realized value changes multiplicatively (scales) with the seller’s signal. Therefore,
he can elicit the bidder’s signal, perform the transformation and find the bidder’s realized
value himself. Thus, the standard question in the signaling literature – how much of his
signal should the seller reveal to the bidders – becomes a question of how refining predictions
affects auction objectives. Our conclusion rephrased in the context of signaling is that, as long
as realized values change multiplicatively with the signal and the above assumptions hold,
revealing information improves both efficiency and revenue. See Section 5 for more detail.
2 The Model
2.1 The Sponsored Search Market
Position auctions, also known as slot auctions, keyword auctions or sponsored search auctions,
are used for selling online advertisement slots that appear next to search results [1, 26, 6]. We
use a standard model for position auctions [16], and modify it slightly to allow us to discuss
the effect of refining relevance predictions.
2.1.1 Position Auctions Model
In the standard static model for position auctions, the single-dimensional private value of
every advertiser is the amount he’s willing to pay per click on his ad. Advertisers’ values are
transformed into values per impression, by multiplying them by click probabilities, known as
click-through rates. We assume that the click-through rates are separable [16], i.e., can be
written as a product of the advertiser’s relevance to the query, and the effect of the slot’s
position on the page. Both components of the click-through rates are predicted by a machine
learning system (see, e.g., [12]).
We use the following notation. For a search query q, the seller has m ad slots to sell to
n advertisers. Advertiser i has a private value vi ∈ R+, and a non-private click-through rate
p(q,i)sj for slot j, where 0 < p(q,i) ≤ 1 is the query-advertiser relevance,4 and 1 ≥ s1 ≥ · · · ≥
sm ≥ 0 are the decreasing slot effects. Where the query q is clear from the context we use pi
to denote the relevance.
4Our results hold when p(q,i) is allowed to have a zero value as well; to simplify the exposition we assume
it is strictly positive.
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The value per impression of advertiser i for slot j is vi,j = pisjvi. The search engine ranks
advertisers according to the component of vi,j that is not slot related:
Definition 2.1 (Realized value). Advertiser i’s realized value for a slot in query q is
r(q,i) = p(q,i)vi
An important feature of the model is that the relation between the values and realized
values is multiplicative.
Note that position auctions generalize multi-item auctions, in which one or more units of
a single item are sold to unit-demand bidders: by setting pi = sj = 1 for every i, j we get a
standard multi-item auction with m identical units.
2.1.2 A Model of Relevance Prediction
As described above, the relevance of each advertiser to a search query is predicted via a
machine learning system. We now provide a model of the system’s output, which we refer to
as a prediction scheme.
The machine learning system has access to a collection of search query and advertiser
features. Possible features include search keywords, geographic location, time, user data and
search history, as well as ad text and landing page [12]. Adopting the standard assumption
that features are discretized, consider the set of all possible query-advertiser pairs. These pairs
are partitioned into types or parts, and for each part, the machine learning system produces
an estimate of the (slot-independent) relevance probability p.5
For example, the following description defines a simple part: “pizza ad, user located in the
Bay Area”. By taking into account additional features, coarse parts can be divided into finer
subparts, such as “pizza ad, user located in San Francisco”. This process is called refining the
partition.
We denote a partition by T and a part by t, and will often use the convention that T¯ is
a coarse partition and t¯ a coarse part, whereas T is a refined partition and t is a subpart.
Given any coarse part t¯, there is a distribution over its subparts {t | t ⊆ t¯} arising from the
underlying distributions of the features.
We can now define a prediction scheme, which is a partition and corresponding relevance
predictions learned by the machine learning system:
Definition 2.2 (Prediction scheme). A prediction scheme is a partition T of all query-
advertiser pairs, and for every t ∈ T a relevance prediction pt for query-advertiser pairs in
part t.6
Overloading notation we denote both a prediction scheme and its partition by T .
How is a prediction scheme T applied in an auction for a query q? For every query-
advertiser pair (q, i), we say that its relevance prediction p(q,i) is according to T if p(q,i) = pt,
where t ∈ T is the part to which the pair (q, i) belongs. The prediction scheme T is applied in
an auction by setting the advertisers’ relevance predictions according to T , finding the realized
values and running the auction on these values.
5We also assume that this system produces the slot-specific relevance parameters (sj ’s), but we don’t need
to specify how this is done because our refinements apply only to the slot-independent terms (pi’s).
6As defined, a prediction scheme is a deterministic clustering scheme [11]. In general a prediction scheme
can also be randomized, containing a distribution over relevance predictions for every part [8, 22]. Our results
hold for randomized prediction schemes as well.
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Figure 1: An example of spread (above) or flipped (below) relevance pairs (see Definition 2.4).
2.2 Prediction Refinements
An important auction design issue is how finer partitions of advertiser-query pairs may affect
auction objectives. As we shall show, this affects the order in which the search engine ranks
advertisers who are competing for slots.7 This in turn could have a significant effect on the
revenue and efficiency of the auction. To study this effect we need a formal definition of
prediction refinement.
Definition 2.3 (Refinement). A prediction scheme T is a refinement of T¯ if its partition is
a refinement of T¯ ’s partition, and the average relevance of all subparts of a coarse part t¯ is its
relevance according to T¯ , i.e.,
pt¯ = Et⊆t¯[pt].
If the subpart and its coarse counterpart are clear from context, we use p and p¯ to denote
the corresponding relevance predictions.
We now define a natural class of refinements – those which distinguish among the adver-
tisers, thus enabling a better matching of advertisements to the query.
Definition 2.4 (Spread or flipped pairs). A pair a, b is spread with respect to a pair c, d if
a
b
≥ c
d
≥ 1 or 1 ≥ c
d
≥ a
b
;
a, b is flipped with respect to c, d if
a
b
≥ 1 ≥ c
d
or
c
d
≥ 1 ≥ a
b
.
See Figure 2.2 for an example.
Definition 2.5 (Flip-spread refinement). A prediction scheme T is a flip-spread refinement
of T¯ if T is a refinement of T¯ , and for every query q and pair of advertisers denoted without
loss of generality 1 and 2, their relevance pair p(q,1), p(q,2) according to T is spread or flipped
with respect to their relevance pair p¯(q,1), p¯(q,2) according to T¯ .
In particular, any refinement is flip-spread for a prediction scheme T¯ that does not distin-
guish among advertisers: If all advertisers competing for a query q belong to the same part in
T¯ and so appear equally relevant, then for every two advertisers it holds that p¯1/p¯2 = 1, and
so any relevance pair is spread or flipped with respect to p¯1, p¯2.
7We assume that the choice of T does not affect the bias of the predictions. Though very fine parts could
cause inaccuracies due to lack of data.
5
Example 2.1. [Flip-spread refinement] Consider the position auction described in the intro-
duction, in which two pizzerias – the first located in San Francisco (SF) and the second in San
Jose (SJ) – compete for a single advertisement slot next to search results for query ‘pizza’. Let
T¯ be a coarse prediction scheme. Assume that both pizzerias are equally popular, and so both
query-advertiser pairs belong to the same part t¯ in T¯ (described as “pizza ad, user located in
the Bay Area”), and their associated relevances are p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯t¯ = 0.75. As mentioned above,
this makes any refinement of T¯ flip-spread.
Now assume the search engine has access to a more precise location feature of the query
q, indicating whether the user is in SF (q = SF) or in SJ (q = SJ), and each occurs with equal
probability 1/2. When the prediction scheme is refined by including this feature, the relevances
p1, p2 according to the refined scheme T behave antisymmetrically: If the query comes from
a user in SF, the relevance p(SF,1) of the SF advertiser is 1 and the relevance p(SF,2) of the SJ
advertiser is 0.5. If the query comes from a user in SJ, p(SJ,1) = 0.5 and p(SJ,2) = 1. Indeed,
in both cases the pair p1, p2 is either spread of flipped with respect to p¯1, p¯2.
Example 2.2. [Non-flip-spread refinement] Consider again a single-slot position auction for
‘pizza’. Assume now that advertiser 1 is a nationwide chain of pizzerias while advertiser 2 is a
local artisan pizzeria in SF. Consider a coarse prediction scheme T¯ as above, and a refinement
T where this time the refining feature indicates whether q = SF (happens with probability
(1/4)− δ for some small δ) or q = ¬SF (happens with probability (3/4)+ δ). The relevance of
advertiser 1 does not depend on user location and his relevance predictions are p¯1 = p(SF,1) =
p(¬ SF,1) = 0.8. On the other hand, the relevance predictions for advertiser 2 are p¯2 = 0.1,
which is the average of pSF,2 = 0.4 and p¬ SF,2 =  (this is by setting δ = 15/(8 − 20)).
Refinement T is not flip-spread, since for q = SF, the advertisers relevance predictions 0.8, 0.4
are not spread or flipped with respect to the coarser predictions 0.8, 0.1.
2.3 Virtual Value Based Mechanisms
2.3.1 The Bayesian Setting
We assume a Bayesian setting in which the advertisers’ values are i.i.d., and are drawn from
a publicly known prior distribution F with a positive smooth density f . The advertisers are
not symmetric since they may have different click-through rates and thus non-i.i.d. realized
values.
Given F with density f from which value vi is drawn, the inverse hazard rate (or infor-
mation rent) of vi is
λF (vi) =
1− F (vi)
f(vi)
.
The virtual value corresponding to vi is ϕF (vi) = vi − λF (vi). A similar definition applies to
the realized value: Given a distribution G with density g from which the realized value ri is
drawn, the realized virtual value of ri is ϕG(ri) = ri − λG(ri). The relation ri = pivi between
the value and realized value implies that
G(ri) = F (vi), g(ri) =
1
pi
f(vi), ϕ
G(ri) = piϕ
F (vi).
Note that MHR (regular) values imply MHR (regular) realized values. We omit F from the
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notation ϕF , λF where the distribution is clear from the context,8 and where vi is clear from
the context we may use the notation ϕi = ϕ(vi).
2.3.2 Standard Assumptions on the Prior Distribution
A distribution F is MHR (montone hazard rate) if its inverse hazard rate function λ(·) is
non-increasing, and is regular if its virtual value function ϕ(·) is non-decreasing. We say that
values are MHR (regular) if they’re drawn from an MHR (regular) distribution, and that a
position auction is MHR (regular) if its advertisers’ values are MHR (regular).
The assumption of MHR values is standard in the mechanism design literature (see, e.g.,
[19]). Many commonly studied distributions are MHR, including the uniform, exponential
and normal distributions, and all distributions with log-concave densities [9]. Every MHR
distribution is regular but not vice versa; an example of a regular but non-MHR distribution
is the equal revenue distribution, defined as F (v) = 1− 1v .
2.3.3 Welfare and Revenue-Optimal Mechanisms
Mechanisms are evaluated according to their performance in terms of expected welfare and
expected revenue, where the expectation is over the value distribution and the query distri-
bution. We discuss briefly the form of the efficiency-optimal and revenue-optimal auctions for
sponsored search as identified by prior literature (cf. [1, 7]).
The VCG auction [27, 4, 13] maximizes expected social welfare among all truthful and
individually rational (IR) mechanisms by finding the most efficient allocation. Every bidder is
charged his externality – the difference between the maximum welfare if he does not participate
in the auction and the welfare of all other bidders when he does. In the context of position
auctions, the most efficient allocation assigns the m advertisers with highest realized values
ri to the m slots, after ordering them from high to low (we assume throughout that ties are
broken lexicographically). See [1] for the exact form of the VCG prices in the sponsored search
setting.
The revenue-optimal mechanism [23] maximizes expected revenue among all truthful and
IR mechanisms. To find the optimal allocation, Myerson proved the following key lemma for
single-item auctions, which relates the expected revenue of an allocation rule to the (realized)
virtual surplus served by it. Recall that an allocation rule is monotone if for every bidder i
and every fixed set of bids by bidders other than i, bidder i’s expected allocation (weakly)
increases with its bid. We now restate Myerson’s lemma in the context of position auctions.
Lemma 2.6 (Myerson [23] for sponsored search auctions). Every truthful, IR position auction
has a monotone allocation rule. Moreover, its expected revenue is equal to its expected realized
virtual surplus, i.e., Ev[
∑
i,j sjϕi(ri)xi,j(v)] where xi,j(v) indicates if bidder i wins slot j given
value profile v.9
When values are regular, the Myerson mechanism maximizes expected revenue by assigning
up to m slots to the ≤ m advertisers with highest non-negative realized virtual values, in high
8In particular, by ϕ(vi) we refer to the virtual value and by ϕ(ri) we refer to the realized virtual value.
9Myerson also showed that there is a unique pricing rule that yields a truthful IR mechanism when coupled
with a monotone allocation rule. Notice however that the form of this pricing rule is rendered unimportant
because this lemma gives us a handle on revenue even without knowing the precise form of the prices.
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to low order.10 By regularity, if an advertiser’s value increases then his position can only
increase, and so the allocation rule is monotone, hence truthful.
2.3.4 Definition of Virtual Value Based Mechanisms
We now define a class of truthful mechanisms of which Myerson and VCG are extremal mem-
bers. In Section 2.4 we will show that these mechanisms optimize convex combinations of
efficiency and revenue.
Let v be an advertiser’s value drawn from the distribution F . Recall that λ(v) is the
inverse hazard rate of v.
Definition 2.7 (α-virtual value). For α ≥ 0, the α-virtual value of v is
ϕα(v) = v − αλ(v).
Observe that the α-virtual value can be rewritten as a combination of the value and virtual
value: ϕα(v) = (1−α)v+αv−αλ(v) = (1−α)v+αϕ(v). For α = 0 we get the value and for
α = 1 we get the virtual value.
Definition 2.8 (α-virtual value based mechanism). For α ≥ 0, the α-virtual value based
mechanism asks the advertisers to report their values vi, ranks them according to the realized
α-virtual values piϕαi , and allocates the slots to the advertisers with highest non-negative such
values.
The resulting mechanism is deterministic. For α = 0 we get the VCG auction, and for
α = 1 and regular values we get the Myerson mechanism.
Lemma 2.9 (Truthfulness of α-virtual value based mechanism). For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and regular
values, the α-virtual value based mechanism is truthful.
Proof. Since ϕα = (1−α)v+αϕ(v) and the value distribution is regular, ϕα is non-decreasing
in v when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and so the allocation rule of the α-virtual value based mechanism is
monotone; truthfulness follows from Lemma 2.6.
2.4 Pareto Optimal Mechanisms
In this section we consider mechanisms that are optimal with respect to a combination of
expected welfare and revenue. Such mechanisms are termed Pareto optimal, as they lie on
the Pareto frontier of welfare and revenue. Myerson and Satterthwaite [24] originally estab-
lished the form of Pareto optimal mechanisms in a slightly different context; they used such
mechanisms to guarantee individual rationality and incentive compatibility for bilateral trade.
We study these mechanisms because we expect the search engine to use a mechanism from
this family. Naively, you would think that the search engine ought only to care about its own
revenue, but revenue as modeled in this paper is just ‘short-term’ revenue. In the long run,
search engines are invested in the health of their ad markets, and it is reasonable to assume
10Lahaie and Pennock [15] study methods for optimizing revenue of sponsored search auctions given a
practically motivated constraint, that we rank by functions of the form pαi vi. They note that Myerson’s virtual
value based approach does not fit this scheme.
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that they care about more than just short-term revenue, i.e., for instance, a combination of
efficiency and revenue.11
We now discuss the form of Pareto optimal mechanisms for sponsored search auctions and
show that they are virtual value based. That is, for regular value distributions and for every
fixed trade-off (1−α)E[welfare]+αE[revenue], the α-virtual value based mechanism is optimal
among all truthful mechanisms.12 Thus, every point on the Pareto frontier among welfare and
revenue can be realized by a virtual value based auction.
Recall the standard rearrangement inequality :
Lemma 2.10. For every two decreasing vectors r and s such that r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rn and s1 ≥
· · · ≥ sn, and for every ranking (permutation) pi of {1, . . . , n},∑
i
sirpii ≤
∑
i
siri. (1)
Lemma 2.11 (Pareto optimal mechanism). Consider a regular position auction and a convex
combination objective (1 − α)E[welfare] + αE[revenue], where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Then the optimal
mechanism for this objective among all truthful and IR mechanisms is the α-virtual value based
mechanism.
Proof. Applying Myerson’s lemma (Lemma 2.6) we get that the mechanism’s objective is to
maximize
(1− α)Ev[
∑
i,j
vi,jxi,j(v)] + αEv[
∑
i,j
sjϕ(ri)xi,j(v)] =
Ev[
∑
i,j
xi,j(v) · ((1− α)sjri + αsjϕ(ri))]
Therefore, by the rearrangement inequality, the optimal allocation rule takes up to m bidders
with highest non-negative combinations (1 − α)ri + αϕ(ri), and assigns them one by one to
the highest slots. This is precisely the α-virtual value based mechanism, which is guaranteed
to be truthful by Lemma 2.9.
3 How Does Refinement Affect Market Efficiency?
In this section we consider the effect of refined relevance prediction on the welfare guarantees
of Pareto optimal mechanisms; see Section 2.4 for a discussion of why we think search engines
would use a mechanism from this class. Thus, our goal is to study how the market is affected
by refined relevance predictions. In our main technical result, we identify natural sufficient
conditions under which refining the prediction improves the welfare of any Pareto optimal
mechanism.
11As Likhodedov and Sandholm [18] discuss in the context of multi-unit auctions, such mechanisms can be
used to to maximize expected welfare subject to a minimum constraint on the expected revenue. More recently,
Diakonikolas et al. [5] study the computational complexity of implementing such mechanisms for single-item
auctions; they show that the problem is NP-hard, and provide an FPTAS for the two bidder case.
12This holds for irregular value distributions as well, where α-virtual value is replaced by ironed α-virtual
value.
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Theorem 3.1 (Refined prediction improves welfare). Consider an i.i.d., MHR position auc-
tion and let M be a Pareto optimal mechanism. Then for every value profile v, coarse predic-
tion scheme T¯ and flip-spread refinement T , runningM with T increases welfare in comparison
to running M with T¯ .
Note that this result holds entirely pointwise, that is, it does not require averaging over
the value profiles, nor does it require averaging over the subparts of T to which the query-
advertiser pairs belong to (the latter is required by Theorem 4.1 on improving welfare-revenue
trade-offs).
What is the technical content of this theorem? Recall that in a single-item auction setting
when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular (or MHR) distribution, the revenue-optimal and
the efficient auction both rank bidders in the same order; of course, the revenue optimal
mechanisms excludes bidders with negative virtual values by using a reserve price. In the
sponsored search context, even when the value per click distributions are IID and mhr, the
presence of the relevance terms cause the revenue-optimal ranking to differ from the optimal
one. What we will show is that the difference between the revenue and efficiency rankings (or
more precisely between the efficient and Pareto optimal rankings) diminishes with refinements
so long as the conditions stated in the theorem statement above hold.
3.1 Proof of Main Result
In Pareto optimal auctions, bidders are ranked according to their α-virtual values ϕα = v−αλ.
We can thus think of α ∗ λ as a “penalty” on the value imposed by the seller. In expectation,
the inverse hazard rate is the rent a winning bidder manages to keep to himself out of his
total value when the seller applies the optimal mechanism. Thus a seller aiming to maximize
expected revenue ‘penalizes’ bidders with large rents and demotes them. The monotonicity
of the relative size of the penalty in comparison to the value plays an important role in our
analysis; we will show that when this quantity is falling, refinements bring the revenue optimal
ordering closer to the efficient one.
Definition 3.2 (Bid penalty fraction). For every value v ∼ F with inverse hazard rate λ, its
penalty fraction is λ/v.
For MHR distributions, the penalty fraction is non-increasing: I.e., for every two values
v1 > v2 drawn from an MHR distribution F ,
λ1
v1
≤ λ2
v2
, (2)
since the inverse hazard rates satisfy λ1 ≤ λ2.
However, monotonicity of the penalty fraction does not hold for all regular distributions
– see distribution in Example 3.2. In a sense, mhr characterizes distributions with non-
increasing penalty fractions: If the hazard rate was decreasing (i.e., the inverse hazard rates
are increasing), it would be possible to shift the distribution far enough to the right so that
the penalty fractions are increasing.
If, as for MHR distributions, the relative effect of the penalty diminishes as the value grows
larger, then values grow further apart after transforming them into α-virtual values. Let v1, v2
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be two i.i.d. MHR values, and let their α-virtual values be ϕα1 , ϕα2 . Then we claim that
v1
v2
<
ϕα1
ϕα2
=⇒ v1 > v2. (3)
We now prove our claim. Assume for contradiction that v1 < v2 and v1ϕα2 < v2ϕα1 .
Plugging in ϕαi = vi − αλi we get
v1v2 − αv1λ2 < v1v2 − αv2λ1 ⇐⇒ v1λ2 > v2λ1,
achieving a contradiction by Inequality 2.
The next lemma is our key lemma and shows that the ranking of any Pareto optimal mech-
anism becomes more similar to the efficient ranking with refinement. That is, it shows that
if the Pareto optimal mechanism’s allocation is inefficient despite using a flip-spread refined
relevance prediction, then its allocation necessarily remains inefficient when the prediction is
not refined.
Lemma 3.3 (Inefficient allocation with refined prediction). Let prediction scheme T be a flip-
spread refinement of T¯ , and consider two advertisers 1 and 2 whose values are drawn from an
IID regular distribution. Then
p1v1 < p2v2 and p1ϕ
α
1 ≥ p2ϕα2 > 0 =⇒ p¯1ϕα1 ≥ p¯2ϕα2 .
In words, if advertiser 1 has lower realized value than 2 but higher positive realized α-
virtual value according to the refined prediction T , then this holds according to T¯ as well.
Proof. First note that v2 > 0, because advertiser 2’s realized value is strictly higher than
advertiser 1’s. Combining the two inequalities on the lefthand side we get
ϕα1
ϕα2
≥ p2
p1
>
v1
v2
.
Because the value distribution is mhr, we can applying Equation 3 to show that v1 > v2,
and so:
ϕα1
ϕα2
≥ p2
p1
>
v1
v2
> 1. (4)
By definition of a flip-spread refinement, the pair p1, p2 is spread or flipped with respect
to p¯1, p¯2. So
p2
p1
> 1 =⇒ p2
p1
≥ p¯2
p¯1
. (5)
Equations 4 and 5 combined show that p¯1ϕα1 ≥ p¯2ϕα2 , completing the proof.
We now state and prove a technical lemma that generalizes the classic rearrangement
inequality (Lemma 2.10). Consider two orderings pi1, pi2 of the same ground set (1, . . . , n). We
say that pi1 is more ordered than pi2 if for every pair of elements i > j which appear in order
in pi2, they also appear in order in pi1, i.e., pi2(i) > pi2(j) =⇒ pi1(i) > pi1(j).
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Lemma 3.4 (Generalized rearrangement inequality). Rename the advertisers such that their
realized values are decreasing, i.e., r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rn. Let pi1, pi2 be two rankings of the advertisers
such that pi1 is more ordered than pi2. Let s be a vector of n decreasing slot effects s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sn.
Then s · r(pi1) > s · r(pi2).
For the proof we use the following notation: A ranking pi is just an ordered vector of the
advertisers 1, . . . , n. We use i < j for advertisers and x < y for their ranks. So pix is the
advertiser that appears in rank x in pi, and pi(i) is the rank of advertiser i in pi. The notation
r(pi) means that we are ordering the vector r in the same order in which the advertisers appear
in pi, that is, rpi1 , . . . , rpin . So
s · r(pi) =
n∑
x=1
sxrpix =
n∑
i=1
spi(i)ri.
Proof. We first prove the statement for two rankings pi1, pi2, which are identical except for two
advertisers i < j that appear consecutively in both but in flipped order. I.e, let x = pi1(i) and
y = pi1(j), then x = y − 1 and
x = pi2(j) = pi2(i)− 1 = y − 1
(we are using here the assumption that pi1 is more ordered than pi2 and so i must appear
before j in pi1).
Observe that for such rankings, since the only difference is advertisers i < j appearing in
consecutive ranks x < y in pi1 and in flipped ranks y, x in pi2, to show that s · r(pi1) ≥ s · r(pi2)
it’s sufficient to show
sxri + syrj ≥ syri + sxrj . (6)
Since vectors s, r are decreasing, sx ≥ sy and ri ≥ rj , and so by the standard rearrangement
inequality Condition 6 holds.
We now turn to general rankings pi1, pi2. To show that s ·r(pi1) ≥ s ·r(pi2), we conceptually
run a “bubble sort” on pi2 to turn it step by step into pi1. In every step, we compare a
pair of adjacent advertisers in pi2 and swap them if their order does not match that of pi1.
The proof is complete by noticing that since pi1 is more ordered to begin with, then pi2 is
becoming increasingly more ordered along the process, because two advertisers are swapped
only if they’re in the wrong order. Therefore we can apply the above claim to get that s ·r(pi2)
is non-decreasing with each step, thus completing the proof.
We now show that in the more general setting of Theorem 3.1, inefficiencies due to refine-
ment never occur.
of Theorem 3.1. By assumption, the n advertisers have i.i.d., MHR values. We can assume
that m ≥ n, i.e., that there are enough slots for all the ads. This is without loss of generality
since the click-through rates of the lowest slots can be set to zero, by setting their slot effects
sj = 0. Observe that in a position auction with enough slots, an assignment of the advertisers
to the slots is inefficient if and only if there are two advertisers who are assigned slots and for
whom the following holds: the advertiser with the lower realized value among the two gets the
higher slot, and vice versa.
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Let the Pareto optimal mechanismM be the α-virtual value based mechanism which ranks
the advertisers according to ϕα (Lemma 2.11). Fix a value profile v, and for every advertiser,
a query-advertiser part and subpart according to T¯ and its flip-spread refinement T . This
fixes for every advertiser i the relevance predictions p¯i according to T¯ and pi according to T .
Consider the assignment chosen by M when using the flip-spread refinement T for query-
advertiser relevance predictions. Assuming the chosen assignment is inefficient, without loss
of generality let advertisers 1 and 2 be such that both are assigned, and advertiser 1 has a
lower realized value but higher slot than advertiser 2. Formally, ϕα1 , ϕα2 ≥ 0, p1v1 < p2v2 and
p1ϕ
α
1 ≥ p2ϕα2 .
If ϕα2 > 0, we can now invoke Lemma 3.3 to get that p¯1ϕα1 ≥ p¯2ϕα2 . If ϕα2 = 0, the same
inequality holds trivially. We have shown that if advertiser 1 is ranked above advertiser 2 by
mechanism M using the flip-spread refinement T , then M will also rank 1 above 2 when using
the coarse prediction scheme T¯ .
Let pi1 be the ranking of advertisers byM using T , and let pi2 be the ranking of advertisers
by M using T¯ . We have shown that pi1 is more ordered than pi2. We now apply Lemma 3.4.
Note that the realized values are calculated with respect to the refined relevance prediction
T , since these are the values that realize the welfare of M . Lemma 3.4 shows that running
M with the flip-spread refinement T instead of T¯ increases the welfare, thus completing the
proof.
3.2 Bad Examples and Necessity of Assumptions
We now demonstrate via examples that the assumptions like the ones made in Theorem 3.1
are necessary. All examples use two advertisers, one ad position, and use the revenue-optimal
mechanism.
Recall the position auction described in Example 2.1. We assume both advertisers’ values
are i.i.d. and drawn from a regular distribution F with density f . The realized values of the
advertisers are as follows:
1. r(SF,1) = v1, r(SJ,1) = v1/2;
2. r(SJ,2) = v2, r(SF,2) = v2/2;
For the analysis we fix two values v ≥ v′ > 0 drawn from F , but do not specify which value
belongs to which advertiser (the advertisers are i.i.d. so each of the two possibilities occurs
with probability 12). Let ϕ,ϕ
′ be the virtual values corresponding to v, v′; by regularity of F ,
ϕ ≥ ϕ′. We assume that ϕ′ is non-negative and ϕ is positive, since otherwise refinement does
not change the allocation of the revenue-optimal mechanism, and therefore has no effect on
welfare. We also assume without loss of generality that the user is from SJ (the other case is
symmetric).
3.2.1 When refinement reduces efficiency
Assume v > v′ (if v = v′ then allocation using the user’s location is always efficient). We show
that a necessary condition for inefficiencies due to refinement to occur is
v′
v
<
1
2
<
ϕ′
ϕ
, (7)
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and that if Condition 7 holds, then efficiency loss of magnitude v/2−v′ occurs with probability
1
2 .
Assume first that Condition 7 holds. With probability 1/2, the SF advertiser has the
higher among the two values, and its realized value v/2 is higher than the other realized value
v′ by Condition 7. If the location data is ignored, the SF advertiser with the higher value wins
and the assignment is efficient. But if the location is used for refinement, the SJ advertiser’s
virtual value ϕ′ is higher than ϕ/2 (Condition 7), and so there is efficiency loss of v/2− v′.
We now show that condition 7 is necessary, and there are no other cases of inefficient
allocation due to refinement. Without refinement, the advertiser with the higher value wins,
so an inefficiency due to refinement occurs only if the advertiser with the lower value wins and
only if his realized value is lower. This yields Condition 7. Now consider the case in which
the SJ advertiser has the higher value. The SF advertiser cannot win after refinement since
its virtual value ϕ′/2 is lower than ϕ, so in this case there is no inefficiency due to refinement.
We summarize the total expected loss in welfare from inefficiencies due to refinement:
ˆ vmax
vmin
ˆ v¯
2v′
(v/2− v′)f(v)f(v′)dvdv′, (8)
where [vmin, vmax] is the range of F , and v¯ is defined to be the value such that the corresponding
virtual value ϕ(v¯) is equal to 2ϕ′.
3.2.2 When refinement increases efficiency
A similar analysis to the above shows that a necessary condition for refinement to increase
efficiency is:
1
2
< min{v
′
v
,
ϕ′
ϕ
}. (9)
When Condition 9 holds, then efficiency loss of magnitude v/2−v′ occurs with probability 1/2:
If the SF advertiser gets the higher value, condition 9 implies that its realized value is lower.
As above, with no refinement the SF advertiser wins and with refinement the SJ advertiser
wins. So in this case lack of refinement leads to an efficiency loss of v/2− v′.
The total expected loss in welfare from inefficiencies due to coarseness is
ˆ vmax
vmin
ˆ 2v′
vmin
(v/2− v′)f(v)f(v′)dvdv′. (10)
3.2.3 MHR example – refinement increases efficiency
Example 3.1 (MHR values). Let F be the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. There are no
inefficiencies due to refinement since Condition 7 never holds:
v′
v
<
ϕ′
ϕ
=
2v′ − 1
2v − 1 ⇐⇒ v
′ > v,
in contradiction to the definition of v, v′ by which v ≥ v′.
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3.2.4 Non-MHR example – refinement can reduce efficiency
Example 3.2 (Non-MHR values). Let H = 103 be a truncating parameter and b = −1 be a
shifting parameter. Let F be a variant of the equal revenue distribution achieved by truncating
its support from [1,∞) to [1, H], and shifting it to the right by |b| (if H =∞ and b = 0 we get
the standard equal revenue distribution). The truncation ensures that F has finite expectation
so that Myerson’s theory (Lemma 2.6) applies; the reason for shifting will become apparent
below. The resulting distribution over the support [2, H + 1] is
F (v) =
H
H − 1(1−
1
v + b
).
F is regular since its virtual valuation function ϕ(v) = ((v+ b)2/H)− b is increasing; note
that since b < 0, ϕ(v) is also strictly positive for every v. However, F is not MHR, since its
inverse hazard rate function λ(v) = v− ((v+ b)2/H) + b increases with v in the range [2, 501].
By calculating and comparing the integrals in Equations 8 and 10, we show that the
expected loss due to refinement is higher than that due to coarseness, and so in this example,
the flip-spread refinement that takes into account user location hurts the expected welfare of
the revenue-optimal mechanism. Details of the calculation appear in the appendix.
3.2.5 Non-Flip-Spread Refinements
We now consider the slightly modified setting of Example 2.2. Recall that in this setting,
the user location sometimes made the advertisers seem more “similar”, and as a result, in
more direct competition. To take advantage of the direct competition, the revenue-optimal
mechanism sometimes allocates to the advertiser with lower realized value, increasing the
expected revenue but decreasing the welfare, as demonstrated below.
First, we show that pointwise over the bids, the flip-spread assumption is necessary in
a strong sense for a result such as Theorem 3.1. That is, if the ad relevances draw closer
together without flipping, for every non-degenerate mhr distribution, there exist valuations for
which efficiency of the revenue-optimal mechanism falls with refinement. To construct such
an example, for any refined relevance pair p1 > p2, you could pick two values v1 and v2 > v1
such that both virtual values are positive but near-zero, the realized value after refinement of
the first advertiser (p1 · v1) dominates the second (p2 · v2), but the realized virtual value of the
second advertiser (p2 ·ϕ2) slightly exceeds that of the first (p1 ·ϕ1). Thus after refinement, the
revenue-optimal ranking disagrees with the efficient one. Now if the relevance pair p1, p2 is not
flip-spread with respect to the unrefined relevance pair p¯1, p¯2, the unrefined revenue ranking
will agree with the efficient one, and thus refinement causes efficiency loss.
We now show for a specific selection of relevance parameters, refinements, and value dis-
tributions, that efficiency loss can happen in expectation when the flip spread assumption is
violated. We use the relevance probabilities from Example 2.2. Assume that the advertisers’
values v1, v2 are drawn independently from the MHR uniform distribution over range [3, 5].
The ranges of their realized values and virtual values are as follows: Since his relevance predic-
tion is 0.8 whether or not the prediction scheme is refined, advertiser 1’s realized value range
is [2.4, 4] and his virtual value range is [0.8, 4]. As for advertiser 2, there are three cases to
consider:
• q = SF and the refined scheme T is applied: realized value range is [1.2, 2] and virtual
value range is [0.4, 2];
15
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
08
0.
10
0.
12
Efficiency loss as a function of second ads' relevance.
relevance of second ad
lo
ss
Figure 2: Efficiency loss of the revenue-optimal auction versus the efficiency-optimal auction
for example in Section 3.2.5 as a function of the relevance of the second advertiser.
• q = ¬SF and the refined scheme T is applied: realized value range is [3, 5] and virtual
value range is [, 5];
• The coarse scheme T¯ is applied: realized value range is [0.3, 0.5] and virtual value range
is [0.1, 0.5].
Applying the refined prediction scheme T which uses the location data lowers the expected
welfare: Observe that the realized value of the advertiser 1 is always higher, and when T¯ is
applied its virtual value is always higher as well, guaranteeing an efficient allocation. But
because when q = SF relevance predictions of the advertisers become closer, the range of
advertiser 2’s refined virtual value overlaps that of advertiser 1, so advertiser 2 sometimes
wins despite this being inefficient.
How often would we expect such inefficienies due to non flip-spread refinements in general?
Assuming the setting of parameters as above, suppose we vary the second advertiser’s relevance
from 0 towards 0.8, and plot efficiency loss against the optimally efficient outcome; see Figure
3.2.5. As the figure shows, several refinements that are not flip-spread would still result in an
efficiency increase. For instance, any refinement where p¯2 > 0.4 and p2 is in the range [p¯2, 0.8]
would cause an efficiency increase. However, when p¯2 < 0.4 and p2 is in the range [p¯2, 0.4],
the corresponding refinement causes an efficiency drop. Thus, we would expect that if the
relevances of advertisers were initially roughly comparable (recall that for the first advertiser,
p1 = p¯1 = 0.8), any refinement ought to improve expected efficiency.
3.2.6 Non-i.i.d. advertisers
The previous example can be adjusted such that the resulting setting is completely equiva-
lent, but now T is a flip-spread refinement of T¯ . This is by noticing that if advertisers are
allowed to be non-i.i.d., a flip-spread refinement can make them more similar instead of more
distinguished. For example, let advertiser 2’s value be uniform over [1.2, 2] instead of [3, 5],
and assume that finding out the user is in SF makes the advertisers’ relevances flip from, say,
0.8, 0.25 to 0.8, 1. The ranges of their realized values however get closer, and the virtual value
ranges overlap as above, leading to inefficiency.
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4 Should the Search Engine Refine Predictions?
The previous section focused on data revelation that increases the welfare of all Pareto optimal
auctions, and identified sufficient conditions under which signaling improves welfare. In this
section we investigate the search engine’s incentive to perform refinements. We assume that the
search engine optimizes a fixed convex combination of revenue and efficiency (see Section 2.4 for
justification of this assumption), and show that refinement only improves the mixed objective.
This generalizes [10], who show the same result for the revenue-optimal mechanism.
Theorem 4.1 (Refinement improves trade-off objective). Consider a position auction and
let M be a Pareto optimal mechanism. Let T be a prediction scheme that is a refinement
of another prediction scheme T¯ . Then running M with T improves the objective of M in
expectation in comparison to running M with T¯ .
Proof. By Lemma 2.11,M should maximize the expected realized α-virtual surplus. For every
fixed search query q, by Lemma 2.10, ranking the advertisers according to their realized α-
virtual values maximizes the realized α-virtual surplus, and this is achieved by using T instead
of T¯ . Taking expectation over q completes the proof.
The implication of the above theorem is that the seller should use as refined a prediction
scheme as possible.
Notice that this result is less conditional than Theorem 3.1, that is the MHR, i.i.d. values
and flip-spread refinement assumptions are not necessary. In fact, the fact that no condition
of flip-spread is imposed on the refinement means that there must be a non-trivial trade-off
between efficiency and revenue. In terms of efficiency, refining ad infinitum will not always be
the right thing to do. But given that the search engine has already fixed a desired trade-off
among efficiency and revenue, the best thing to do in terms of this trade-off is to use the
α-Pareto optimal mechansim, and refine as far as possible.
Our main corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 3.1, and states
that prediction refinement can simultaneously increase the welfare and the expected objective
of every Pareto optimal mechanism. In particular this holds for the Myerson mechanism.
Corollary 4.2 (Refinement improves welfare and trade-off). Consider an i.i.d., MHR position
auction and let M be a Pareto optimal mechanism. Then for every coarse prediction scheme
T¯ and flip-spread refinement T , running M with T increases both welfare and M ’s objective
in expectation, in comparison to running M with T¯ .
5 Relation to Signaling
5.1 Our Result Applied to Signaling
In our model of relevance prediction, the features of the search query that determine the
relevance scores can be viewed as private information held by the seller. This information,
despite being unknown to the bidders, determines their realized values for the items. Auctions
with seller information appear in the seminal work of Milgrom and Weber [21] and have been
extensively studied in the economic literature (see, e.g., [3, 17]), and recently also in the
computer science literature, where they’re sometimes called probabilistic auctions [8, 22, 10].
This reflects the fact that when the seller does not reveal his information, the bidders only
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know its distribution and so the realized values are stochastic. Our model is a special case in
which the seller information affects the realized values multiplicatively. We also assume that
all privately held information (of the advertisers and seller) is independent.
The above previous works focus on signaling schemes, by which the seller communicates
his information to the bidders. A signaling scheme maps the seller’s information to a possibly
random output signal (a deterministic scheme is called a clustering scheme - see [11]). Based
on the observed output signal, the bidders adjust their realized values according to their
posterior belief about the seller’s information. Overloading notation, we denote the belief
when no information is released by t¯ and after seeing the output signal by t. Observe that
prediction refinement is mathematically equivalent to signaling, since given the features of
the search query, the seller can either use a general query part t¯ to predict relevance, or use
more information in form of a refined subpart t. In practice, prediction refinement avoids the
communication costs involved in signaling information to the advertisers,13 and so may be
desirable when many features are involved, provided that the seller knows how to translate
the reported values into realized values.
We can now state our main result in the context of signaling, under the assumption that
the seller’s information determines multiplicative factors by which bidder values are scaled.
Let T¯ determine the multiplicative factors without revealing information and let T replace
T¯ when information is revealed. We say that the signaling scheme is flip-spread if T is a
flip-spread refinement of T¯ . Then a flip-spread signaling scheme for an i.i.d., MHR position
auction and Pareto optimal mechanism improves both efficiency and the mechanism’s objective
in expectation.
Levin and Milgrom [17] discuss how fine-grained signaling can affect display ad auctions.
One of the topics they study is how revenue is impacted by ‘thin auctions’. Our results apply
to their setting (under the assumption that signals are multiplicatively combined).
5.2 Relation to the Linkage Principle
The fundamental linkage principle of [21] states that full revelation of seller information is
revenue-optimal (see also [14, Chapters 6 and 7]). In Appendix A.2 we highlight the differences
of our work in terms of the model, mechanism and result statement.
6 Open Questions
Our results rely on the multiplicative assumption, which is natural in the context of position
auctions. Can they be generalized to include additional effects that refinement may have on
realized values, perhaps using some linear approximation? How can the notion of flip-spread
refinement be generalized?
We have shown that for the Myerson mechanism, flip-spread refinements improves both
welfare and revenue. For which other mechanisms does this desirable property hold?
13This is not the case in display ads, in which some engines report the user type to the advertisers and allow
them to update their bids arbitrarily.
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A Appendix
A.1 Analysis of Example 3.2 (Efficiency Loss Due to Refinement for Reg-
ular Distribution)
In this appendix we provide the calculations for Example 3.2, which demonstrates that when
advertisers’ i.i.d. values are drawn from a regular but non-MHR distribution, the expected
welfare of Myerson can decrease following a flip-spread refinement.
Define ∆ to be the difference between the expected efficiency loss due to refinement and
the expected efficiency loss due to coarseness, when the values are drawn from the truncated
shifted equal revenue distribution defined above in the example. In this analysis we use the
notation s instead of v. Recall that s¯ is such that ϕ(s¯) = 2ϕ(s′).
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A.1.1 Step 1
In this step we show that
∆ =
1
2
ˆ H+1
2
(
(s¯− 2s′)F (s¯) + s′F (s′)−
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds
)
f(s′)ds′.
Consider the difference for fixed s′:
ˆ s′
c
s′
(s′ − cs)f(s)ds+
ˆ s¯
s′
c
(s′ − cs)f(s)ds =
ˆ s¯
s′
(s′ − cs)f(s)ds
= s′
ˆ s¯
s′
f(s)ds− c
ˆ s¯
s′
sf(s)ds.
We integrate by parts:
ˆ s¯
s′
f(s)sds = F (s)s |s¯s′ −
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds
= s¯F (s¯)− s′F (s′)−
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds.
Plugging in:
cs¯F (s¯)− cs′F (s′)− c
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds− s′F (s¯) + s′F (s′) =
(cs¯− s′)F (s¯) + (s′ − cs′)F (s′)− c
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds =
c
(
(s¯− s
′
c
)F (s¯) + (
s′
c
− s′)F (s′)−
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds
)
A.1.2 Finding v¯
(s¯− 1)2 +H
H
=
2(s′ − 1)2 + 2H
H
s¯ = 1 +
√
2(s′ − 1)2 +H
A.1.3 The expressions to integrate
We use the following:
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds =
H
H − 1
ˆ s¯
s′
(1− 1
s− 1)ds
=
H
H − 1
(
s− log(s− 1) |s¯s′
)
=
H
H − 1
(
s¯− log(s¯− 1)− s′ + log(s′ − 1))
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So the inner function before multiplying by f(s′) is:
1
2
(
(s¯− 2s′)F (s¯) + s′F (s′)−
ˆ s¯
s′
F (s)ds
)
=
H
2 (H − 1)
(
(s¯− 2s′)(1− 1
s¯− 1) + s
′(1− 1
s′ − 1)− s¯+ log(s¯− 1) + s
′ − log(s′ − 1)
)
=
H
2 (H − 1)
(
s¯− 2s′ − s¯− 2s
′
s¯− 1 + s
′ − s
′
s′ − 1 − s¯+ log(s¯− 1) + s
′ − log(s′ − 1)
)
=
H
2 (H − 1)
(
log(s¯− 1)− s¯− 2s
′
s¯− 1 −
s′
s′ − 1 − log(s
′ − 1)
)
Multiplying by f(s′) = HH−1 · 1(s−1)2 and plugging in s¯ = 1 +
√
2(s′ − 1)2 +H, we get three
integrals as follows (we write them without the factor of 12
(
H
H−1
)2
for simplicity):
1
2
ˆ H−b
1−b
log(2(s′ − 1)2 +H)
(s′ − 1)2 ds
′ =
1
2
ˆ H
1
log(2x2 +H)
x2
dx
ˆ H−b
1−b
1 +
√
2(s′ − 1)2 +H − 2s′
(s− 1)2√2(s′ − 1)2 +H ds′ =
ˆ H
1
√
2x2 +H − 2x− 1
x2
√
2x2 +H
dx
=
ˆ H
1
x−2dx−
ˆ H
1
2x+ 1
x2
√
2x2 +H
dx
ˆ H−b
1−b
s′
(s′ − 1)3 +
log(s′ − 1)
(s− 1)2 ds
′ =
ˆ H
1
x+ 1
x3
+
log x
x2
dx
A.1.4 Calculating the integrals
First integral:
√
2 arctan(
√
2x√
H
)
√
H
− log(H + 2x
2)
2x
|H1 =
√
2 arctan(
√
2H√
H
)
√
H
− log(H + 2H
2)
2H
−
√
2 arctan(
√
2√
H
)
√
H
+
log(H + 2)
2
=
√
8H
(
arctan(
√
2H)− arctan(√2/H))− logH − log(1 + 2H) +H log(H + 2)
2H
= 3.51487
Second integral:
1− 1
H
−
(
−
√
H + 2x2
Hx
− 2 log(
√
H(H + 2x2) +H)√
H
+
2 log(
√
Hx)√
H
|H1
)
= 0.7298
Third integral:
−4x+ 2x log x+ 1
2x2
|H1 =
5
2
− 4H + 2H logH + 1
2H2
= 2.4911
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A.1.5 Putting everything together
1
2
(
H
H − 1
)2
(3.51487− 0.7298− 2.4911) = 0.1473.
The final answer is positive, and so we have shown that the inefficiencies due to refinement
surpass those due to coarseness in this example.
A.2 Relation to the Linkage Principle
The Milgrom-Weber model is more general than ours in that realized values depend on the
seller’s information in an arbitrary way (and can also depend on other bidders’ private values).
This dependence however must be the same for all bidders. This symmetry requirement is
crucial, and without it releasing seller information may actually harm revenue [25, 14, Chapter
8]. In contrast, an inherent feature of our model is that advertisers can be asymmetric or even
antisymmetric in the way their relevance changes as more features are used for prediction. We
remark that the Milgrom-Weber model also allows a certain form of correlation among private
information called affiliation (see [14, Appendix D] and [2, FKG inequality]).
Milgrom and Weber do not consider direct revelation mechanisms as we do, since in their
model the information of the seller and other bidders can affect realized values arbitrarily.
Instead they analyze first price, second price and English auctions assuming symmetric (pos-
sibly untruthful) equilibruim bidding. Their result that using full seller information is optimal
holds even for the second price auction with no reserve. This is not the case in our model,
where we show that the combined objective of a Pareto optimal mechanism increases given
refined prediction.
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